Standard Essential Patent (“SEP”) Litigation
Technology
implementers accuse SEP holders of charging excessive licensing fees based on
weak patent portfolios and of using litigation threats. In response, SEP
holders claim that technology implementers may 'free ride' on their innovations
and consciously infringe intellectual property rights (“IPR”) without engaging in good faith licensing negotiations.
Disputes and delays in negotiations between SEP implementers and holders may
ultimately lead to a technology chilling-effect.[1]
Therefore both parties have to come up with a common understanding of what fair
licensing conditions and fair rates are, through good faith negotiations.
Currently,
licensing is hampered by unclear and diverging interpretations of the meaning
of Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory[2]
(“FRAND”), valuation principles and the
availability of injunctive relief. Such relief aims to protect SEP holders
against infringers unwilling to conclude a license on FRAND terms. At the same
time, safeguards are needed against the risk that good faith technology users
threatened with an injunction may accept licensing terms that are not FRAND, or
in the worst case, are unable to market their products by patent hold-up.[3]
This threat of injunctive relief brings anti-competition into question, mainly
under abuse of dominance within the relevant market by SEP holder.
FRAND Licensing and Valuation
FRAND license terms
may not be universal. Instead the royalty rate and other license terms can
differ from sector to sector, region to region, and over time. While FRAND
license terms include “non-discrimination,” this applies to so-called
“similarly-situated” licensees. Imposing FRAND terms on such entities and thus
permitting deviations in FRAND terms among those not similarly situated, means
that SEP holders and implementers can assess the unique circumstances of a
particular potential licensee to differentiate it from other licensees. There
are, therefore, opportunities to leverage unique circumstances and still arrive
at FRAND license terms. Both parties must be willing to engage
in good faith negotiations, with the view to establishing licensing conditions
that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. Parties to a SEP licensing
agreement, negotiating in good faith, are in the best position to determine the
FRAND terms most appropriate to their specific situation.
Of
the many different approaches to determine an appropriate royalty rate, two
frequently identified in different court decisions worldwide are: (i)
determining the share of contribution of a particular SEP, by referencing, for
example, existing comparable licenses (bottom-up approach); and (ii)
calculating the share in the calculation base of the contribution of all SEPs
for a given standard and then allotting a share to individual SEPs (top-down
approach). These two approaches are not contradictory. Both approaches may be combined
to calculate the rate so as to ensure a more reliable rate through comparison
of the results.[4]
Turkey
There
hasn’t been any cases or investigations brought to national IP courts or Turkish
Competition Authority (“TCA”),
regarding SEP litigation/injunctive relief and FRAND-encumbered licenses.
However, the TCA and national IP courts comply with the EU legislations and
most likely choose one of the approaches of EU jurisprudence for their
decisions.
The Yonga
Levha[5] (2003)
decision of the TCA is the most relevant example to the conflict between
technical standardization and anti-competition law in Turkey. While cases like Bilsa[6]
and Anadolu Cam[7] may
also be relevant in within the abuse of dominance domain related to IPR or
restrictive conduct; only Yonga Levha
addresses the potential anti-competitive conduct between competitors by
changing technical standards in the Particle Board/Chipboard sector. The TCA in
its decision evaluated whether the collaboration between competitors to set new
technical standards cause entry barriers to newcomers or discriminatory
behavior.[8]
Because the collaboration did not constitute discriminatory behavior, TCA did
not fine the parties and allowed implementation of the new Chipboard standard.
The
following case law from certain Civil law jurisdictions were novel verdicts at
the time to solve ambiguities in SEP litigation, particularly for defining
FRAND licensing terms and the role of competition law in IP litigation.
European Union: Huawei v. ZTE[9]
Framework
Injunctions are
governed by each Member State that implements the European
Union (“EU”) Directive on the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. The Commission Guidelines
on SEPs also referenced to the European Court of Justice (CJEU) Huawei v. ZTE decision. Suggesting that
this decision is not the exclusive framework, the EU emphasized the need to
conduct a proportionality assessment on a case-by-case basis, leaving
substantial discretion to courts.[10]While
patents are secured country by country and can only be enforced in the country
in which granted, the EU views worldwide SEP licenses as efficient and
compatible with FRAND. However, because patent law, damages doctrines, SEP
portfolios and other considerations differ by country, it is not uncommon for a
worldwide SEP license to set different rates by country or region. With
regional differences, businesses can leverage lower regional rates and license
(or cross license) terms that may be unique to their business model and market.[11]
In Huawei v. ZTE
the CJEU was asked whether a user of a FRAND-committed SEP should be able to
avoid an injunction merely by expressing its “willingness” to negotiate a FRAND
license, or whether an injunction could be granted unless the user made a
binding offer to the SEP holder on terms that the SEP holder could not refuse.[12]Some
national courts, particularly those in Germany, followed the second
approach.
The judgment confirms that EU competition law indeed
has a part to play in controlling the enforcement of SEPs; but not as “extensively
or intrusively” as the Commission had proposed. Broadly the position is that
competition law merely bolsters existing FRAND commitments and compels owners
of SEPs to offer to grant licenses on such terms. The emphasis is away from enforcement action
by competition authorities and towards the national courts: “The practical
effect is that provided a patentee has acted reasonably in making what he
reasonably believes to be a FRAND offer to an implementer he is unlikely to be
subject to enforcement proceedings by the competition authorities only because
his offer turns out not to be FRAND. The
emphasis is on a FRAND defense before a national court, not enforcement by
competition authorities.”[13]
If a patentee has made what he reasonably considers a
FRAND offer and the implementer disputes that the offer is FRAND, the patentee
will be able to enforce its SEPs including by way of injunction against that
implementer unless the implementer engages in good faith with the
patentee. In particular if the patentee
offers to have the question of whether his offer is FRAND arbitrated and the
implementer refuses that offer, much the stronger view is that the patentee may
obtain an injunction.[14] The implementer can be compelled to make
interim payments into a safeguarded bank account or provide a bank guarantee
whilst the FRAND dispute is resolved.
So-called “hold-out” is no longer possible, at least to any great
degree.
A
major problem arising post-Huawei case
law[15]
is the portfolio transfer of larger SEP patent holders to patent assertion
entities (popularly referred as “patent trolls”) which then sue standard
implementers. Courts frequently have to assess whether the new SEP owners are
bound by the original SEP owners’ FRAND declarations and whether the licensing
conditions they request are FRAND in particular if they coincide with licensing
requests made by original owner for other, non-transferred parts of their
portfolios.”[16]
Secondly, the valuation of FRAND royalties are often left for parties to decide
on (where in Unwired v. Huawei the
Court’s calculation lead to controversy of interference to licensing
negotiation), but the question of concrete valuation remains an open one within
EU jurisprudence.
China: A Fault-based approach
Chinese
telecommunication firms have become the spotlight of the current SEP
litigation. As a legal system, that largely based its IPR regime on Continental
European counterpart, the case law from China has to be taken into
consideration.
China’s High
People’s Court of Guangdong issued Guidelines from the international practices
on litigation and “fault-based” approach from its former SEP litigations: Huawei v. Samsung and Iwncomm v. Sony .According to the
Guidelines, when requested to decide whether to grant injunctive relief to an
SEP holder, a court should evaluate the “fault” in the SEP holder and
implementer’s conduct during licensing negotiations.[17]
The Guidelines include determining FRAND royalty rates when certain conduct
violates China’s anti-monopoly law. Like the EU’s approach, China’s Guidelines
emphasize the balance of interests among SEP holders, licensees and the public,
based on the market value of SEPs in dispute and the licensing conditions, while largely favoring the top-down approach for royalty
calculations.
The Guidelines,
however, largely disfavor injunctions. Under the Guidelines, courts should
grant injunctions only when the implementer is clearly at fault and the SEP
holder is not (or is relatively less at fault). It is suggested that only
infringer’s apparent bad faith, or at least some indication of bad faith, must
be present to justify an injunction.[18]
In SEP cases, injunctive relief may often be
sought as a form of leverage to incentivize the SEP implementer agree to a SEP
license, one reason why the Guidelines are important for companies doing
business in or with China. Injunctive relief may often be sought as a form of
leverage to incentivize the SEP implementer agree to a SEP license, one reason
why the Guidelines are important for companies doing business in or with China.[19]
Conclusion
For
SEPs, FRAND-encumbered licensing negotiations are currently the most favored
method of preventing potential litigation or injunctive relief that may cause
further complications to innovation and competition. While different industries
may not be able to directly apply the experience taken form the abovementioned examples;
the case-by case approach of the FRAND dispute settlement can perhaps allow
courts to reevaluate licensing agreements more flexible than a strict set of
bylaws and precedents. On the other hand, not having harmonized rules –for the
time being- in international legislation brings challenges for national
judiciary when dealing with multinational disputes. Tensions between tendencies
towards harmonization in technical standard-setting against
techno-nationalistic agendas to protect national industry is one of the main
challenge national SSOs deal with.[20]
Nevertheless, as “standard takers” of developing economies become “standard
makers” and compete with industrial leaders of developed economies (with large
patent portfolios); we can expect the negative tendency towards harmonization
to more robust approaches to standardization and standard-essential IPR.[21]
Author:
Sinan Erkan
[1]
European Commission, Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents,
Brussels, 29.11.2017 COM(2017) 712, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583
[2] The definition of FRAND and its licensing
conditions were mentioned in our previous article “Standard Essential Patents
I- Introduction and Foundations”, available at: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=61e1e622-5a12-4cf5-8f79-d7ed498882d7
[3] Ibid.
[4] Japan
Patent Office, Guide to Licensing
Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents, June 5 2018 (English). As a
technologically innovative country with a Continental European/Civil law system,
the Japanese SEP litigation has been influenced by European Union Guidelines
and jurisprudence.
[5] TCA Nr.03-56/650-298 14.08.2003
[6] TCA Nr.
07-26/238-77 21.03.2007
[7] TCA Nnr.07-47/506-181 05.06.2007
[8] Berkay Ergün, Zorunlu Standard
Patent(SEP) Bağlamında Hâkim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması, Seçkin Yayınları
(2020) 99-100
[9] Case
C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp, 16 July 2015
[10]
European Commission, Standard Essential Patents (n.1)
[11] Ibid.
[12] Sir Robert Jacob Alexander Milner, ‘Lessons
from Huawei v. ZTE,' (2016), available at: https://www.4ipcouncil.com/news/latest-research-4ip-council-lessons-huawei-v-zte
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] See
Sisvel v. Haier Appeal II (2nd order) OLG Düsseldorf (I-15 U 66/15) 17 November 2016
and Unwired v. Huawei High Court od
England and Wales [2017] (EWHC 711)
[16] Picht,
Peter Georg, “Standard-essential patents: limiting exclusivity for the sake of
innovation in Drexl, Josef and Sanders,Anselm Kamperman (eds.), The
Innovation Society and Intellectual Property, European Intellectual
Property Institutes Network Series Edward Elgar Publishing (2019) 215 The
example again reflects Rambus (Case
COMP/38.636 – RAMBUS) decision of the
Commission on “patent ambush”.
[17] Adrian
Emch, ‘New SEP guidelines from Guangdong’, Kluwer Competition Law Blog, June 1
2018, available at: http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/06/01/new-sep-guidelines-guangdong/
[18] Johnson
Hines, Doris and Yang, Ming-Tao, “Worldwide activities on licensing issues
relating to standard essential patents”, WIPO Magazine (2019), available at: https://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2019/01/article_0003.html
[19] Emch
(n.3)
[20] Maskus
Keith and Merrill Stephen A.(eds), Patent
Challenges for Standard-Setting in the Global Economy Lessons from Information
and Communication Technologies, The National Academies Press (2013)138
[21] Ibid.
139